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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2002, consumers filed a class action lawsuit against McDon-
ald's, Burger King, Wendy's, and Kentucky Fried Chicken alleging that fast
food was responsible for their obesity and poor health.' Predictably, a barrage
of op-ed pieces denounced the lawsuits as "absurd"2 and an attempt to "bilk
burger joints for billions." 3 One Seattle restaurant even went so far as to require
customers to sign a tongue-in-cheek waiver of liability when they ordered a
popular dessert known as "The Bulge."
4
Although public opinion ridiculed lawsuits against Big Fat, law profes-
sor John F. Banzhaf of George Washington University, famous for his involve-
ment in the tobacco litigation, says that he has heard this argument before.
"Everything's always called frivolous, but we just keep winning the damn
things." 5 As a general proposition, Banzhaf's theory can be succinctly stated as
follows: fast food companies have neglected to inform consumers about the
dangers of their products, have made misleading health claims, and have exerted
undue pressure on children in order to increase revenue. These infractions, the
reasoning goes, have all played a causative role in the development of a number
of health problems ranging from obesity to diabetes. Accordingly, plaintiffs are
entitled to compensation in the form of economic and non-economic damages.
The issue has captured the attention of Congress, which has introduced
three bills in direct response to the fast food litigation. 6 Two bills seek to pre-
empt current and future lawsuits that allege injuries that arise from the consump-
tion of a restaurant's food products. 7 Another bill would require restaurants to
place nutritional information about their food products in plain view so that con-
sumers can make well-informed decisions when they order their meals.
8
1 See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), dismissed by 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,2003).
2 Oh, temptation, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 2002, at 12.
3 Joel Mowbray, Sue McDonald's?, NATIONAL REviEW, Dec. 2, 2002, available at LEXIS,
News Library, National Review file.
4 Blane Harden, Fat-laden Dessert Mocks Obesity Suits, WASH. POST., Sept. 21, 2003, at All.
(describing "The Bulge" as a "sugarcoated, deep-fried, ice cream swaddled, caramel-drizzled,
whipped-cream-anointed banana").
5 Libby Copeland, Snack Attack: After Taking On Big Tobacco, Social Reformer Jabs at a
New Target: Big Fat, WASH. POST., Nov. 3, 2002, at F1.
6 See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003); The Menu Education and
Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).
7 See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
8 See The Menu Education and Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).
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Whether these bills will become law is a question that will only be answered in
time. It can be said however, that for better or worse, Professor Banzhaf and his
lawsuits have already had an impact on the American political and legal land-
scape.
The analysis herein will subject Professor Banzhaf s novel theory to the
rigorous contours of tort and product liability jurisprudence. Part II begins with
a brief discussion of the current state of law surrounding fast food litigation and
then presents the three issues that were discussed in the plaintiffs amended com-
plaint when heard during the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss stage in the litiga-
tion process. Next, Part III focuses on providing clear distinctions between the
fast food litigation and the previously successful tobacco litigation upon which
the plaintiff's rely. Part IV considers the consequences of proposed legislation
that will effectively preempt future lawsuits of this nature. Finally, Part V con-
cludes by providing a brief and concise summation of the legal and social rami-
fications of fast food litigation.
II. A PLAINTIFF'S ROADMAP FOR SUCCESS: PELMAN V. MCDONALD'S
In the interest of brevity, the following summation serves to highlight
only those allegations that were considered by the court in the plaintiffs'
amended complaint. While the court spoke at considerable length on issues
ancillary to these allegations when it rendered its opinion on the original com-
plaint, the focus of this section is to provide the reader a brief background of the
pertinent issues surrounding fast food litigation.
On January 22, 2003, the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of
New York decided the first case involving fast food litigation. 9 As is always the
case when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "courts must 'accept as
true the factual allegations of the complaint, and draw all inferences in favor of
the pleader." '"0 "The complaint may only be dismissed when 'it appears be-
yond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitled [sic] him to relief."'"1
The facts of Pelman are straightforward. The class action infant plain-
tiffs, Ashley Pelman and Jazlen Bradley, purchased and consumed fast food on a
regular basis throughout their respective lives.' 2 While the complaint did not
specify the number of meals consumed at McDonald's, affidavits attached to the
opposition papers suggest significant consumption. 3 One plaintiff stated that
9 See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), dismissed by 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003).
1o Id. at 524 (citing Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993)).
11 Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957)).
12 Id. at 519.
13 Id. at 538 n.28.
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between the ages of five and twelve, she visited McDonald's "approximately
three to four times a week."'14 Another explained, "on ... [her] way to school
and during school lunch breaks, . . . [she] mostly ate at McDonalds [sic] restau-
rants." 15 As a result of this consumption, the plaintiffs alleged that they "have
become overweight and have developed diabetes, coronary heart disease, high
blood pressure, elevated cholesterol intake, and/or other detrimental and adverse
health effects as a result of the defendants' conduct and business practices."
16
On August 22, 2002, suit was filed in the State Supreme Court of New
York, Bronx County, but it was subsequently removed to the Federal District
Court in the Southern District of New York.17 The plaintiffs alleged the follow-
ing five claims against McDonald's: 18 1) McDonalds's deceptively advertised
their food as healthy, and failed to adequately disclose nutritional information,
2) McDonald's induced children to eat their products through deceptive market-
ing techniques, 3) McDonald's negligently sold "food products that are high in
cholesterol, fat, salt and sugar when studies show that such foods cause obesity
and detrimental health effects," 4) McDonald's failed to warn consumers of the
unhealthy attributes of McDonald's products, and 5) McDonald's negligently
marketed food products that were "physically and psychologically addictive."
1 9
None of these counts survived 12(b)(6) scrutiny.
20
In the Pelman opinion, Judge Robert W. Sweet went to great lengths to
create a roadmap for the plaintiffs success when he described in detail the
showing needed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. After the court sus-
tained McDonald's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff amended the complaint to
include only three causes of action. 21 After considering these arguments, the
22
court again sustained the motion to dismiss with prejudice. The followingsection will summarize Judge Sweet's analyses on each of the three counts.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 519.
17 Id.
18 Note that the first two counts are based on deceptive acts and practices in violation of the
Consumer Protection from Deceptive Acts and Practices Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. §§ 349, 350 (2004),
and the NEW YORK CiTY ADMINISTRATIVE CODES §§ 20-700-06 (2003). Id. at 520.
19 id.
20 Id. at 543.
21 See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [here-
inafter Pelman 11].
22 Id. at *1.
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III. JUDGE SWEET'S ANALYSES OF THE PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT
The plaintiffs' amended complaint focused on the following three
counts, all of which were alleged to be in violation of New York's Consumer
Protection from Deceptive Act and Practices Act ("Consumer Protection
Act"): 23 1) that McDonald's misled the public through advertising campaigns
that purported to sell nutritious food products, 2) that McDonald's failed to ade-
quately disclose pertinent health information, and 3) that McDonald's engaged
in unfair and deceptive activities by stating that itprovided adequate nutritional
information to consumers when in fact it did not. The plaintiffs again alleged
that these deceptive acts all resulted in debilitating health conditions such as
obesity, diabetes, coronar heart disease, high blood pressure, elevated choles-
terol levels, and the like.
2!
A. A Procedural Hurdle: The Statute ofLimitations
The court began its analysis with an evaluation of whether the plaintiffs'
claims were time barred by the statute of limitations.26 In both the original and
amended complaints, the plaintiffs relied on a 1987 McDonald's advertising
campaign in which the New York Attorney General's Office conducted an in-
vestigation of deceptive advertising practices.27 Under New York law, however,
a three-year limitations period on deceptive practices has been recognized.
28
While the plaintiffs made several attempts to convince the court that this period
did not apply under these particular facts, only one argument was successful:
that the statute of limitations did not run because several members of the plain-
tiffs' class action suit were "infants" (i.e., those plaintiffs under the age of eight-
een). 29 New York law recognizes that the statute of limitations does not begin
to accrue until an infant plaintiff reaches the age of eighteen. In this case,
23 N.Y. GEN. Bus. §§ 349, 350 (2004). Note that section 349 makes unlawful "deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service
in this state." Id. § 349. Note also that section 350 prohibits "false advertising in the conduct of
any business." Id. § 350.
24 Pelman I, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 at *6.
25 Id. at *7.
26 Id. at **12-18.
27 Id. at *12.
28 Id. at **12-13 (citing Morelli v. Weider Nutrition Group, Inc., 712 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2000)).
29 Id. at **17-18.
30 Id. (citing Henry v. City of New York, 724 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1999)).
2005]
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seven members of the class fit the definition of an "infant.' Accordingly, the
court ruled that all claims by adult plaintiffs based on the 1987 McDonald's
advertising campaigns were time-barred by the statute of limitations. 32 On the
other hand, all claims brought by infant. plaintiffs were allowed to proceed.
3 3
B. Substantive Hurdles: Causation & Deceptive Advertisements
After ruling that only the infant members of the plaintiffs class could
survive the statute of limitations analysis, the court next turned to the following
three issues: 1) whether the plaintiffs were justifiable in their reliance on
McDonald's deceptive advertising campaign, 2) whether the consumption of
McDonald's food products caused the plaintiffs' injuries, and 3) whether the
McDonald's advertising campaigns were objectively misleading.34 The court
found against the plaintiffs on two of the issues and dismissed the complaint
with prejudice.
35
1. Plaintiffs Can Establish Reliance on Deceptive Advertising
Claim
The plaintiffs were able to successfully state a false advertising claim in
their amended complaint. 36 Section 350 of New York's Consumer Protection
Act prohibits "false advertising in the conduct of any business." 37 New York
common law also makes clear that in order to state a claim under section 350,
the plaintiff must allege "reliance on the allegedly false advertisement."
38
To meet this burden, the plaintiffs cited as evidence a McDonald's ad-
vertising claim in which it stated that the ingredients in french fries and hash
browns would be "switched to 100 percent vegetable oil," when in fact, those
products contained "beef or extracts and trans fatty acids." 39 Drawing all rea-
31 Id. at **17-18.
32 Id. at *18.
33 Id.
34 Id. at **19-39.
35 Id. at *39.
36 Id. at ** 19-27.
37 N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 350; see also Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608, 611-12 (N.Y.
2000) (stating that a plaintiff, to bring a claim under section 349, must prove: first, that the chal-
lenged act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way;
and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act).
38 See Andre Strishak & Assoc., P.C. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 752 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002).
39 Pelman 11, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15202 at *25.
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sonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, the court ruled that the infant plain-
tiffs were aware of this advertising claim and would not have purchased or con-
sumed McDonald's products but for the false advertising claim.40 As will be
discussed later, however, this claim was unable to survive additional procedural
hurdles because the plaintiffs were unable to establish causation of injuries and
that the advertising campaign was objectively misleading.
2. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Causation of Injuries
One of the reasons that the plaintiffs were unable to survive 12(b)(6)
scrutiny in their claims for false advertising is because they could not establish
the element of causation.41 At the outset of its discussion, the court noted that
this element was the "most formidable hurdle for [the] plaintiffs" to overcome.42
In order to proceed under section 350 of the New York Consumer Protection
Act, the plaintiffs needed to show that the consumption of McDonald's food
products caused identifiable injuries "'as a result of a deceptive act." 4 3 While
the amended complaint did provide evidence of the plaintiffs enormous appetite
for McDonald's food products,44 it did not address other variables, such as exer-
cise and genetic history, that also play a causative role in the outcome of a per-
son's overall physical condition.45 Without such evidence, the court noted, it is
impossible to determine if McDonald's food products caused theplaintiffs' obe-
sity, or if those food products were only a contributing factor. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs were unable to establish causation in their claims that they had
suffered injuries as a result of the over-consumption of McDonald's food prod-
ucts.
47
3. Reliance on Advertisement Was Not Objective
The plaintiffs were also unable to survive 12(b)(6) scrutiny in their
claims for false advertising because they could not sufficiently establish that the
40 Id. at *26.
41 Id. at ** 26-34.
42 Id. at 26.
43 Id. (quoting Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 741 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002)).
44 Id. at *31 (quoting the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the court stated as an example that
Jazlyn Bradley is alleged to have "'consumed McDonald's foods her entire life ... during school
lunch breaks and before and after school, approximately five times per week, ordering two meals
per day"').
45 Id at **31-32.
46 Id. at *33.
47 Id. at *34.
20051
7
Richardson: Want Fries with That - A Critical Analysis of Fast Food Litigatio
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
advertisements were objectively misleading.4 8 In order to demonstrate that an
advertisement is misleading under section 349 of the New York Consumer Pro-
tection Act, the plaintiff must show that "a reasonable consumer would have
been misled by the defendant's conduct."
49
In this case, the plaintiffs contended that McDonald's made two misrep-
resentations to consumers in its advertisements. 50 First, the plaintiffs alleged
that McDonald's misrepresented the cholesterol content of its french fries and
hash browns when it stated that these products contain "zero milligrams of cho-
lesterol." 51 In point of fact, however, this assertion was flatly wrong. The court
immediately noted that the plaintiffs' amended complaint was factually incor-
rect concerning the language of the advertisement in question because the
McDonald's advertisement actually states that "a regular order of french fries is
surprisingly low in cholesterol and saturated fat: only 9 mg of cholesterol and
4.6 grams of saturated fat."
52
Having fallen well short of the mark in their first allegation, the plain-
tiffs next turned to a McDonald's advertisement that stated that its fries are
cooked in "100 percent vegetable oil" which thus rendered its fries cholesterol-
free. 53 The plaintiffs allege that McDonald's never disclosed to the public that
its cooking process includes a substance known as "beef tallow," which is "be-
lieved to be a source of cholesterol."54 In its brief analysis of this issue, the
court stated that this allegation cannot be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion because it was made within the plaintiffs' opposition brief and not within
the amended complaint.55 Had the plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint
that the beef tallow contained cholesterol, it is at least possible that this allega-
tion would have survived the court's scrutiny. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs,
however, this allegation was not made, which left the court no other option but
to sustain McDonald's motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs' failed to suffi-
ciently allege that the McDonald's advertisements were objectively mislead-
ing.
56
In sum, the plaintiffs were unable to survive McDonald's motion to dis-
miss because they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
48 Id.
49 Id. (citing Marcus v. AT&T Co., 138 F.3d 46, 64 (2d Cir. 1998)).
so Id. at **35-39.
51 Id. at *35.
52 Id. at **35-36.
53 Id. at 36.
54 Id. at 37 n.6.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 39.
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While the plaintiffs were able to show that they relied on McDonald's advertis-
ing campaigns to purchase vast quantities of its products, it simply could not be
established that the consumption of McDonald's food products was the primary
cause of the plaintiffs' health problems or that the McDonald's advertisement
campaign was objectively deceptive.
IV. DELINEATING THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FAST FOOD
LITIGATION AND TOBACCO LITIGATION
It is generally recognized that "tobacco litigation" 57 has been a virtual
cash cow for the legal profession over the past ten years. 58 The plaintiffs bar
has successfully argued a variety of issues including claims relating to the harm-
ful effects of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco, secondhand smoke, ad-
vertising, and the failure to warn consumers of hazardous effects. 59 Most re-
markable was the famous "Master Settlement Agreement" that was signed in
1998 between five tobacco companies and attorney generals from forty-six
states.60 In that agreement, the tobacco companies agreed to pay over $246 bil-
lion to the states as a result of the costs incurred by the states from treating to-
bacco-related illness. 61 Private legal fees incurred as a result of this agreement
border on the miraculous: eleven Florida law firms raked in $3.4 billion, six
Texas law firms collected $3.3 billion, and thirteen Mississippi law firms took in
$1.4 billion.
62
Numbers like these give a considerable economic incentive to enterpris-
ing lawyers seeking to broaden the marketplace by finding deep-pocketed de-
fendants who are alleged to have caused a variety of social ills. Among these
defendants are highly profitable fast food companies that sell fatty foods with
little nutritional value. As mentioned earlier, the plaintiff's bar, relying on
57 For purposes of this Note, the term "tobacco litigation" refers to the myriad legal tactics the
plaintiffs bar has employed to successfully sue tobacco companies over the effects of their prod-
ucts.
58 See generally, WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS (2003) (discussing the social,
economic, and legal ramifications of class action lawsuits in general, and tobacco lawsuits, in
particular); see also Dwight J. Davis et al., "Fast Food": The Next Tobacco?, 4 ENGAGE 121
(2002) (providing a general overview of the major issues involved in fast food litigation).
59 See generally Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond--A Cri-
tique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1334 (2001) (discussing
mass tort litigation tactics used by plaintiffs).
60 See High Cost of Litigation, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London, U.K.), Oct. 29, 2003, at D2.
61 See Janice Billinglsy, Cancer Report Cites Issues with Cigarette Filters, CHi. TRIB., May
26, 2002, at D4.
62 See Saundra Ton-y, Huge Fees for Anti-Tobacco Lawyers, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1998, at
Al, AI0.
63 See generally infra note 64 and accompanying text.
2005]
9
Richardson: Want Fries with That - A Critical Analysis of Fast Food Litigatio
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
precedent established by tobacco litigation, is now targeting these companies in
an effort to hold them liable for the poor physical condition of millions of un-
healthy Americans. This section will attempt to delineate several distinctions
between tobacco and fast food litigation by taking the following issues in turn:
A) procedural distinctions, B) substantive distinctions, and C) factual distinc-
tions.
A. Procedural Distinctions
Critical to the analysis of fast food litigation is the issue of class action
certification. Because plaintiffs have a considerable economic incentive to file
their claims as a class action,64 the issue of certification will likely play a central
role in any future litigation. This section addresses the issue of whether the fast
food litigation plaintiffs can meet the requirements necessary to achieve class
action certification. The first subsection discusses the specific parameters set
forth in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while the second sub-
section applies the history of the tobacco-related case law to the facts of the fast
food litigation.
1. Class Action Certification: Requirements of Rule 23
In order to certify a class action lawsuit, a plaintiff must meet the spe-
cific requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.65 That•. 66
rule contains the following four specific prerequisites. First, Rule 23(a)(1)
requires that the class be "so numerous that joinder of all members is impracti-
cable."'67 Second, the rule requires that "there are questions of law or fact com-
64 See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of
Large Scale Litigation, 11 DuKE J. CoMp. & INT'L L. 179 (2001) (describing the efficacy of Rule
23 as it relates to mass tort class actions).
65 FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For an excellent discussion of the class action device used in the context
of mass tort claims, see generally John Starnes, Note, Class Certification in Mass Product Liabil-
ity Litigation: Argument for a Pragmatic Approach, 31 U. MEM. L. REv. 175 (2000). The article
advocates the increased usage of the class action device in mass tort claims. See id.
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Subsection (a) of the rule provides:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numer-
ous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
67 Id. at 23(a)(1).
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mon to the class. ' 68  The third prerequisite found in Rule 23(a) is that "the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or de-
fenses of the class." 69 The final prerequisite requires that "the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
70
Should the plaintiff provide sufficient evidence to meet these prerequi-
sites, he then must satisfy the conditions of a least one of the subsections of Rule
23(b).71 These three subsections represent the three types of certification that
may be granted to a class. Under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), class action certifica-
tion is appropriate when claims require a single adjudication that would bind all
class members.
72
68 id. at 23(a)(2).
69 Id. at 23(a)(3).
70 Id. at 23(a)(4).
7t FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The rule provides:
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in ad-
dition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards
of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropri-
ate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with re-
spect to the class as a whole or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the inter-
est of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecu-
tion or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
Id.
72 Id. at 23(b)(1)-(2).
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The third subsection that grants class certification is found in 23(b)(3).
73
This subsection requires certification when common questions of law or fact
predominate over individual issues and when a class action is superior to other
methods of adjudication.74 Rule 23(b)(3) provides a list of the following four
factors that help courts determine whether the class action is in fact a superior
method of adjudication: A) class member interest in individually controlling the
litigation, B) amount of litigation already commenced by class action members,
C) desirability of centralizing litigation in one forum, and D) any management
difficulties likely to be encountered.
75
Even a cursory examination of this rule suggests that the typicality pre-
requisite is immediately called into question when it is applied to the facts of the
fast food litigation. In fact, the court mentioned in a footnote in the first Pelman
opinion that obtaining class action certification would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the plaintiffs to show. 76 The court noted in its analysis that the plain-
tiff would probably not even be able to bear its burden to meet the prerequisite
requirement of typicality when it stated that it is "difficult to imagine how the
typicality requirement would be satisfied, as any named plaintiff's injuries
would necessarily be a product of the particular variables surrounding the plain-
tiff, whether social, environmental, or genetic."
77
While Judge Sweet's argument is facially reasonable, it is necessary to
compare it with the previously successful tobacco litigation. The following sub-
section briefly outlines the history of the tobacco class action lawsuit and then
applies those rules to the facts in Pelman.
2. Tobacco Class Certification: A History of Failure
In making their initial arguments for the decertification of a plaintiffs'
class, fast food companies are likely to rely upon tobacco-related case law that
applies Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Three significant
cases that address the issue of class certification are discussed below.
73 Id. at 23(b)(3).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Pelman v. McDonald's, 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 539-40 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
77 Id.
78 See generally Mark C. Weber, Thanks for Not Suing: The Prospects for State Court Class
Action Litigation over Tobacco Injuries, 33 GA. L. REv. 979 (1999) (discussing the significant
barriers to the use of the federal class action lawsuit to redress tobacco-related injuries); see also
Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1336 (1999) (describing the plaintiffs' repeated failures at certifying a class).
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a. Castano v. American Tobacco Co.
A leading federal case concerning the decertification of a tobacco-
related class is Castano v. American Tobacco Co.79 In Castano, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's certification of a nationwide
class of nicotine-addicted persons who had used tobacco to the detriment of
their own health.9° The district court certified the class under Rule 23 on sev-
eral key issues that satisfied Rule 23's requirements of predominance and supe-
riority because variations in state laws did not threaten predominance, and that
the efficiency of the class action device outweighed any manageability con-
cerns.81 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Jerry Smith decertified the class
because the plaintiffs had alleged an "immature tort," which did not meet Rule
23's superiority requirement for several reasons. 82 First, the court was not con-
vinced that the plaintiffs demonstrated that a single proceeding would yield ju-
dicial economy benefits. 83 Also, the economic circumstances of the plaintiffs'
class did not require the usage of the class action device because "a consortium
of well-financed plaintiffs' lawyers . . . [could] develop the expertise and spe-
cialized knowledge sufficient to beat the tobacco companies at their own
game."
84
While several commentators have devoted entire articles to the ramifi-
cations of Castano,85 an extensive discussion of that case is unnecessary for the
purposes of this Note. As one commentator suggests however, Castano stands
for the proposition that courts should strictly apply Rule 23's commonality, pre-
dominance, and superiority requirements. 
86
79 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
80 Id. at 740-41.
81 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 552-56 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734
(5th Cir. 1996).
82 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746-47.
83 Id. at 747-48.
84 Id. at 747-48 n.25.
85 See Michael H. Pinkerton, Note, Castano v. American Tobacco Company: America's Nico-
tine Plaintiffs Have No Class, 58 LA. L. REv. 647 (1998) (describing Castano's analytical nuances
and its application to future cases); see also Dean Malone, Comment, Castano v. American To-
bacco Co. and Beyond: The Propriety of Certifying Nationwide Mass Tort Class Actions Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit Is a "Novel" Claim or Injury, 49
BAYLOR L. REV. 817 (1997) (outlining Castano 's implications).
86 See Pinkerton, supra note 85, at 657.
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b. Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle
While the tobacco plaintiffs struck out in the above case and others,
87
they were able to register a judgment of an astounding $144.8 billion in Engle v.
R.J. Reynolds,88 which was the largest jury award in United States history.
89
That decision, however, was recently reversed and remanded in Liggett Group
Inc. v. Engle because the plaintiffs' class was improperly certified.
90
Citing more than twenty cases throughout the United States that con-
cluded that certification of smokers cases is "unworkable and improper," the
court synthesized the substance of these decisions when it stated that the "plain-
tiffs smokers' claims are uniquely individualized and cannot satisfy the 'pre-
dominance' and 'superiority' requirements imposed by Florida's class action
rules." 91 In its analysis, the court noted that these requirements cannot be met in
cases where "claims involve factual determinations unique to each plaintiff."
92
The court also cited Castano when it stated, "Rule 1.220 [of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 23]93 also requires that class representation be superior to other available
methods of fairly and efficiently adjudicating the claims presented."94 It rea-
soned that class representation is not "superior" to individual suits when signifi-
cant individual issues of fact exist. After a discussion of doctrinal issues re-
garding choice of law and punitive damages, the court held that class decertifi-
cation was the only proper option available.
96
87 See generally Gilbert Birnbrich, Comment, Forcing Round Classes into Square Rules:
Attempting Certification of Nicotine Addiction-As-Injury Class Actions under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 29 U. TOL. L. REv. 699 (1998) (providing a synopsis of additional
tobacco-related class decertification cases).
88 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd sub nom., Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853
So. 2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). For a general discussion of Engle, see Brian H. Bar, Note,
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds, The Improper Assessment of Punitive Damages for an Entire Class of
Injured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787 (2001).
89 See George Bennett, Tobacco Industry Told to Pay $145 Billion, PALM BCH. POST, July 15,
2000, at Al.
90 Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle, 853 So. 2d 434, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), rehearing
granted sub nora., Engle v. Liggett Group Inc., 873 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2004).
9' Id.
92 Id. at 445.
93 Id. at 445 n.5.
94 Id. at 445.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 470.
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Taken together, Castano and Engle both suggest that the fast food plain-
tiffs will not be able to meet the requirements of Rule 23 because the class ac-
tion device simply does not afford a court the opportunity to fairly analyze all
legal issues related to the case. It would be unfair to find against one plaintiff
when his injury, or the cause of his injury, is unrelated to that of another plain-
tiff. In short, each plaintiff represents a unique set of facts on which to provide
relief. To subject thousands of class members to a single standard begs for a
rigid application of an unjust rule.
c. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon
Since the Pelman court mentioned Rule 23's typicality requirement in a
footnote, 97 it is worthwhile to briefly analyze the hallmark U.S. Supreme Court
case that deals with the typicality issue. In General Telephone Co. of Southwest
v. Falcon,98 the Court considered whether a Mexican-American was a proper
plaintiff class representative in a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 on behalf of other Mexican-American employee applicants who
were not hired.99 In evaluating the typicality requirement, Justice Stevens pro-
vided the following guidance:
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)
tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining
whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a
class action is economical and whether the named plaintiffs
claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of
the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in
their absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge
with the adequacy-of-representation requirement, although the
latter requirement also raises concerns about the competency of
class counsel and conflicts of interest. 100
The Court then held that the plaintiff did not meet the typicality re-
quirement because he failed to identify "the questions of law or fact that were
common to the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he sought
to represent."'1 1 This burden was not met because the plaintiff could not sub-
97 See supra notes 76-77.
98 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
99 Id. at 150; see also Annotation, Gary Knapp, Supreme Court's Construction and Applica-
tion of Rule 23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Concerning Class Actions, 144 L. ED. 2D
889, § 6 (2004).
100 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158 n.13.
101 Id. at 158.
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stantiate his claim that all other Mexican-American employees and applicants
were the victims of the same racial discrimination that he alleged. If that
were the case, the Court noted that "every Title VII case would be a potential
company-wide class action." 10 3 "We find nothing in the statute to indicate that
Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expansion of class-action liti-
gation." 104 The Court continued its analysis in a footnote when it stated the
following: "The mere fact that an aggrieved private plaintiff is a member of an
identifiable class of persons of the same race or national origin is insufficient to
establish his standing to litigate on their behalf all possible claims of discrimina-
tion against a common employer."
10 5
While the facts of Falcon involve a Title VII employment discrimina-
tion claim, the parallels with fast food litigation are nonetheless striking. Both
Falcon and the plaintiffs' claims in the fast food litigation involve "across the
board" allegations that a single entity is responsible for damages incurred by
hundreds of claimants, without regard to specific evidentiary identifications of
tortious harms. In other words, the fast food plaintiffs can all correctly say that
they are obese and suffer from poor health. However, they cannot sufficiently
allege that these health conditions all categorically flow from the consumption
of fast food. Other variables (such as lack of exercise, alternative sources of
food, and patient health history) all play a causal role in the development of
these conditions, and each variable has a different impact on each individual.
As a result, it would be error for a court to assume that one plaintiffs health
condition is typical of hundreds of others.
B. Substantive Distinctions
The plaintiffs bar has used a variety of tactics aimed at the tobacco in-
dustry to recover damages for injuries incurred as a result of tobacco usage. The
most prominent legal theories employed in the plaintiffs arsenal focus on the
principle of strict liability. Claims typically involve allegations of design and
manufacturing defects, the failure to warn, and fraudulent concealment.
10 6
These claims will be taken in turn.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 159.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 159 n.15.
106 See generally Sandra L. Gravanti, Note, Tobacco Litigation: United States Versus Big To-
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1. Design Defects
Suits filed against the tobacco industry typically involve the claim that
tobacco products cause injury because they have defects in their design. These
suits allege that the addictive nature and carcinogenic effects of tobacco prod-
ucts constitute a design defect.' 0 7 These "defects," the reasoning goes, warrant
a finding of liability because the tobacco products in question are unreasonably
dangerous in their design.1
0 8
In making the determination of whether a tobacco manufacturer is liable
for manufacturing a defective product, courts typically look to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A that states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relations with the
seller. 109
In interpreting this section, courts had difficulty determining the exact
nature of proof the plaintiff had to show in order to recover damages."l 0 Does
107 See id. at 674.
1o8 Id.
109 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
110 See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Litigation and Compensation: A Primer on Cigarette Litiga-
2005]
17
Richardson: Want Fries with That - A Critical Analysis of Fast Food Litigatio
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the product have to be defective or unreasonably dangerous? Note here that the
reliance on this subsection of the Restatement allows the plaintiff to frame the
suit as a strict liability action.
The determination of whether a product is defectively designed is gen-
erally evaluated under one of the following two tests: 1) the "danger-utility" test
and 2) the "consumer-contemplation" test. I I A brief discussion of those re-
spective tests follows.
a. Danger- Utility Test
One test frequently invoked by the plaintiffs bar is the "danger-utility
test." 112 That test, which provides for liability if the risks of injury accompany-
ing a product's use outweilhs the utility or social value favoring the continued
availability of the product, is a difficult standard for a plaintiff to meet be-
cause courts often require the plaintiff to establish the existence of an alternative
design that could have reduced the risk of harm. 114 While plaintiffs' victories
are rare in this area, they do exist and have become more prevalent with the dis-
covery of tobacco industry documents that detail specific examples of fraudulent
actions over the previous forty years that were committed by the tobacco indus-
try in an effort to misrepresent the dangers of their products. 115
An application of this standard to any set of facts concerning the con-
sumption (and over-consumption) of fast food reveals that the plaintiff simply
cannot proffer a cognizable case. There is no evidence that the nutritional value
(or lack thereof) of fast food is a result of the deficiencies related to its design.
In fact, fast food is dangerous precisely because its design may work too well.
The Big Mac is not designed to be a healthy meal-it is designed to be a tasty
one. Accordingly, the usage of the "danger-utility" test would fail to provide
the plaintiff a meaningful and successful course of action.
tion Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 27 SW. U. L. Rlv. 487, 492
(1998).
I See Gravanti, supra note 106, at 675-77.
112 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 699 (5th ed. 1984).
113 Id.
114 See Annotation, Burden of Proving Feasibility of Alternative Safe Design in Products Li-
ability Action Based on Defective Design, 78 A.L.R. 4TH 154 (1990).
5ls See generally Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global
Settlement, and the Future of Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REv. 311 (1998).
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b. The Consumer-Contemplation Test
The second test employed by courts when evaluating section 402A is
the "consumer-contemplation" test.116 This test is found in a comment to the
above-quoted language of section 402A which states that a product is "unrea-
sonably dangerous" when it is dangerous "to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer." 117 This test was recently applied in
a federal district court in Wisconsin."18 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that
the cigarettes were defective because the ordinary consumer did not understand
the health risks that flow from the continual usage of tobacco products. 119 Find-
ing for the defendant, the court held that the "consumer expectations" test was
not met because the "habit forming nature of cigarettes" was common knowl-
edge to the ordinary American consumer.t2°
Under this standard, the plaintiffs cannot state a claim because a reason-
able consumer is fully aware of all risks that will be encountered during the
typical foray into Burger King. Consumers have known for years that fast food
contains large amounts of ingredients that are not beneficial to the average per-
son's health (particularly when consumed in large quantities). Moreover, there
is no evidence that the fast food industry has engaged in a deceitful campaign to
trick the American public into the belief that their products are healthy. Accord-
ingly, the plaintiff cannot meet the "consumer-contemplation" test under section
402A that would afford the opportunity to state a successful claim.
2. Failure to Warn
Another common lawsuit against the tobacco industry involved the fail-
ure to warn consumers of the inherent dangers of prolonged tobacco usage.
Under this theory, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable manufacturer would
have warned of the product's dangerous effects that were known during the time
the product reached the consumers.121 Note, however, that this cause of action
has been largely preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
116 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 112, at 698-99.
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
tt8 See Insolia v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1039 (W.D. Wis. 1999), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 216 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2000), remanded to 128 F. Supp. 2d. 1220 (W.D. Wis.
2000).
"9 Id. at 1040.
120 Id.; see also Tompkins v. American Brands, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d. 895 (N.D. Ohio 1993),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 219 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2000), appeal filed, 362 F.3d
882 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that "it was common knowledge even in the 1950s that cigarette
smoking was linked to lung cancer.").
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j. (1965).
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Act, which required health warnings to be placed conspicuously on each ciga-
rette package.
Any claim involving the failure to warn consumers of the dangers of
consuming fast food is likely to fail because fast food is not an unreasonably
dangerous product that would merit a warning. As stated throughout this Note,
ordinary consumers are well-versed on the dangers of the over-consumption of
fast food. A judicially-created mandate that requires a warning that fatty foods
could cause health problems when consumed in vast quantities would be the
height of redundancy. As will be discussed later, however, Congress is contem-
plating legislation that would mandate restaurants with twenty or more outlets to
conspicuously place pertinent nutritional information of every food item on each
123menu.
3. Fraudulent Concealment
The final weapon in the plaintiffs arsenal concerns fraudulent conceal-
ment and is based on the assertion that the tobacco industry intentionally with-
held scientific evidence of the hazardous health effects of tobacco consump-12412
tion. 124 While some plaintiffs have been successful with these allegations,
many of these claims have been dismissed because the dangers flowing from the
continual usage of tobacco were common knowledge and thus no duty existed to
provide consumers such information.126
An application of the fraudulent concealment action to the fast food in-
dustry would fail simply because there is no evidence of fraud perpetuated on
the public regarding the healthiness of fast food. Short of a specific set of facts
that would indicate fraud on the part of the fast food industry, this claim does
not seem to be a worthwhile avenue on which plaintiffs counsel will choose to
travel.
In sum, the typical claims used in lawsuits against the tobacco industry
will not (without a spectacular set of facts) survive a defendant's motion to dis-
miss when used against the fast food industry for health-related injuries.
122 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (2000).
123 See infra Part V.C.
124 See Jones v. Am. Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710-13 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
125 See id. at 721 (holding that plaintiffs did provide sufficient evidence to survive defendant's
motion to dismiss).
126 See Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 80 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Gravanti,
supra note 106, at 677-78.
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C. Factual Distinctions
A clear distinction can be made between fast food and tobacco-that is,
fast food is not an inherently dangerous product when consumed every day. As
the Office of the Surgeon General points out, individual foods, standing alone,
are not unhealthy. 127 Moreover, unlike tobacco, there is no ingredient analo-
gous to nicotine that is found in fast food which is addictive. While many to-
bacco users became addicted to a substance and suffered injury through the con-
tinued use of the product, the same cannot be said for fast food which is con-
sumed, and in the plaintiffs case, over-consumed, entirely through the unob-
structed free will of the consumer.
Another distinction that can be drawn is one that deals with the overall
economic demand of the respective products. This line of reasoning states that
the overwhelming number of Americans that consume fast food products every
day will not stand idle while the government or the court system takes affirma-
tive steps to prohibit, tax, or otherwise regulate the usage of a product they fre-
quently use and enjoy. This rationale is perhaps best stated by several commen-
tators that currently represent Wendy's International Inc.:
Whereas smokers have been a minority of the total
population for decades, the same cannot be said of consumers
of fast food products. Unlike tobacco, there is no minority user
that government might seek to unfairly oppress. Because smok-
ing currently only affects a minority, it has been easier to pass
legislation that prohibits smoking in public places, regulates ad-
vertising, and to levy confiscatory taxes on the product through
attorney general suits and punitive verdicts. In contrast, it
would be a near-impossible task to find a person who has not
eaten some form of fast food. It is a product consumed and en-
joyed by the vast majority of consumers who are not likely to sit
back and suffer through its regulation, indirect taxation or pro-
hibition.1
28
In sum, the plaintiffs are forced to bridge a tremendous chasm when
reconciling the factual differences between tobacco products and fast food prod-
ucts. First, the plaintiffs can point to no addictive substance found in fast food
that compels a consumer to eat vast quantities of those products. Consumers
eat, and in many cases, overeat, fast food solely on the basis of free will. It is
within the exclusive province of the consumer, and not a court, to decide
127 See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION
TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY 2001, available at
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/CalltoAction.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2004).
128 See Davis et al., supra note 58, at 125.
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whether to eat fast food products, and the extent to do so. Second, the over-
whelming demand for fast food products makes it unlikely that a governmental
or judicial action with regards to fast food will go unnoticed by a majority of
Americans. As will be discussed in Part V, even the hint of judicial interference
with the fast food industry has already spurred severe public outcry and legisla-
tive action.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PENDING LEGISLATION
In the wake of the publicity surrounding these lawsuits, Congress has
taken steps to remedy the situation by introducing legislation designed to re-
move the threat of litigation facing the fast food industry. 129 Interestingly, legis-
lation has also been introduced that would direct all restaurants with twenty or
more locations to provide to consumers nutritional information on each of its
products. 13 This section will consider the ramifications of each of these Acts.
A. H.R. 339: Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act
On January 27, 2003, a bill titled the "Personal Responsibility in Food
Consumption Act" was introduced in the House of Representatives that will
effectively preempt any civil actions brought against food sellers for health-
related claims relating to the sell of food products. 13 The stated purpose of the
bill is "to allow Congress, State legislatures, and regulatory agencies to deter-
mine appropriate laws, rules, and regulations to address the problems of weiht
gain, obesity, and health conditions associated with weight gain or obesity." 1
31
Section three of the bill, entitled "Preservation of the Separation of
Powers," expressly prohibits qualified "civil liability actions" in both Federal
and State courts brought on these grounds. 133 Section four defines a "qualified
civil liability action" as the following:
[T]he term 'qualified civil liability action' means a civil ac-
tion brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller
of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages,
penalties, declaratory judgment, injunctive or declaratory
relief, restitution, or other relief arising out of, related to, or
resulting in injury or potential injury resulting from a per-
129 See Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 339, 108th Cong. (2003);
Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003, S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
130 See The Menu Education and Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).
131 H.R. 339.
132 Id. § 2.
133 Id. § 3.
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son's consumption of a qualified product and weight gain,
obesity, or any health condition that is associated with a
person's weight gain or obesity, including an action brought
by a person other than the person on whose weight gain,
obesity, or health condition the action is based, and any de-
rivative action brought by or on behalf of any person or any
representative, spouse, parent, child, or other relative of any
person. 
134
The statute then provides three reasonable exceptions that will allow
plaintiffs to bring civil actions should they meet the statutory requirements. 3 5
The first exception allows lawsuits where a manufacturer or seller
knowingly and willfully violates a Federal or State statute appli-
cable to the manufacturing, marketing, distribution, advertise-
ment, labeling, or sale of the product, and the violation was a
proximate cause of injury related to a person's weight gain, obe-
sity, or any health condition associated with a person's weight
gain or obesity.'
36
The second exception provided by the statute allows a civil suit which
alleges the "breach of express contract or express warranty in connection with
the purchase of a qualified product.' 37 The third and final exception provided
by the statute focuses on actions brought under the Federal Trade Commission
Act of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.' 38 Note, however, that at the
time of this writing, the bill is currently in committee and thereby subject to
further amendment. 139
B. S. 1428: Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003
On July 17, 2003, the Senate also introduced legislation titled the
"Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003" that will serve to prohibit health-
related claims relating to the sell of food products. ' 40 This bill's stated purpose
is to "prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against
food manufacturers, marketers . . .[and] sellers ... for damages or injunctive
134 Id. § 4(5)(A).
135 Id. § 5(B)-(C).
136 Id. § 5(B)(i).
137 Id. § 5(B)(ii).
139 Id. § (5)(C).
139 This Bill was passed by the House of Representatives on March 10, 2004.
140 S. 1428, 108th Cong. (2003).
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relief for claims of injury resulting from a person's weight gain, obesity or any
health condition related to weight gain or obesity."' 14 1 Pertinent statutory lan-
guage states as follows:
(a) IN GENERAL. A qualified civil liability action may
not be brought in any Federal or State court.
(b) DISMISSAL OF PENDING ACTIONS. A qualified
civil liability action that is pending on the date of this Act shall
be dismissed immediately by the court in which the action was
brought or is currently pending. 1
42
The statutory language in this bill is significantly more extensive than
its counterpart in the House because the following subsection explicitly defines
relevant terms such as "engaged in the business,"'143 "manufacturer,"' 14 "quali-
fied product,"'145 and "qualified civil liability action." 146 It is important to note
that while the bill's purpose only addresses causes of action relating to "weight
gain or obesity,"' 147 it does provide a reasonable exception for claims resulting
from a "knowing and willful" violation of a federal or state statute which was a
"proximate cause of the claim of injury resulting from a person's weight gain,
obesity, or health condition."'148 Also noteworthy is the absence of any lan-
guage relating to products liability actions that do not involve claims relating to
obesity. In other words, the bill does not preempt typical tort actions such as
food poisoning that result from the consumption of food products.
While the Senate's "Commonsense Consumption Act of 2003" is still in
committee and thus subject to further amendment, it appears that its thorough-
ness and level of detail would afford the court system an easier and more effi-
cient application to pending and future cases. Unlike the House's version, this
bill goes to great lengths to specify the types of actions, actors, and products that
141 Id.
142 Id. § 2.
143 Id. § 3(i) (defining "engaged in business" as "a person who manufactures, markets, distrib-
utes, advertises, or sells a qualified product in the person's regular course of trade or business").
144 Id. § 3(2) (defining "manufacturer" as "a person who is lawfully cngaged in the business of
manufacturing the product in interstate or foreign commerce").
145 Id. § 3(4) (defining "qualified product" as "food as defined in section 201(f) of the Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321(f))").
146 Id. § 3(5) (defining "qualified civil liability action" as a "civil action brought by any person
against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages or in-
junctive relief based on a claim of injury resulting from a person's weight gain, [or] obesity").
147 Id.
148 Id § 3(5)(A).
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are covered by the statute. Moreover, the bill is consistent with the public pol-
icy rationale that states that businesses should not be held liable, and thereby
subject to crushing liability, for producing a perfectly legal product that can
have, at most, only a tangential role in the development of adverse health condi-
tions.
C. H.R. 3444: The Menu Education and Labeling Act
In response to the health-related concerns raised by the plaintiff's bar to
the fast food industry, Congress has attempted to remedy the situation by intro-
ducing a bill that will affect the manner in which the fast food industry displays
each food item on the menu. In November 2003, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives introduced the Menu Education and Labeling Act ("MENU Act") to ensure
that consumers receive accurate "information about the nutritional content of
restaurant foods."' 14 9 Citing an array of health statistics linking fatty food con-
sumption with heart-related illnesses, Congress evidently believes that increas-
ing the availability of nutritional information will lead to the decreased con-
sumption of fast food, and necessarily, an improvement in the overall health
status of millions of Americans. 1
50
Specifically, the MENU Act requires restaurants with twenty or more
outlets to list the nutritional information for each item on the menu "in a clear
and conspicuous manner." 151 The nutritional information shall include "the
total number of calories, grams of saturated plus trans fat, and milligrams of
sodium" for each menu item.
152
While this bill does seem to serve as an adequate compromise between
the plaintiffs bar and the fast food industry, the realistic impact of such legisla-
tion is unclear. It is noteworthy that Congress does not point to any evidence
that would suggest that increasing the level of nutritional information will have
any negative impact on the consumption of high-fat, high-sodium foods. Bear
in mind, however, that this bill is only at its infancy stage and is subject to con-
siderable debate and amendment.
153
VI. CONCLUSION
The conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis herein are substan-
tial and promising. First, under the current state of the law, it appears that the
149 H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003).
150 See id. § 2.
151 Id. § 3(a).
152 Id. § 3(b).
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plaintiffs simply have no case in their claims that the fast food industry is re-
sponsible for their poor overall physical condition. There is no advertisement
that can be cited which deceived a reasonable consumer into believing that the
excessive consumption of fast food would not adversely impact that person's
health. Moreover, it does not appear that such an advertisement is anywhere in
sight. Short of an affirmative representation that a daily intake of Big Macs will
cause the typical consumer to experience significant weight loss and a dimin-
ished cholesterol level, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will ever be able to point
to an advertisement that suggests to the reasonable consumer that the consistent
consumption of fast food is a healthy activity.
Second, the plaintiffs have an extremely difficult hurdle to overcome in
their attempt to establish causation. Too many variables, such as genetic his-
tory, current and prior levels of activity, exercise patterns, and foods consumed
independently from fast food restaurants, are of a determinative nature to assess
liability exclusively with the fast food industry. It is very difficult, if not impos-
sible, to isolate the effects that fast food has on the overall health condition of a
person while holding constant all other activities that contribute to that condi-
tion. Simply stated, bald assertions that the consumption of fast food caused a
person's obesity are not sufficient-more evidence must be proffered that spe-
cifically indicates the nature of the harm that fast food consumption has caused
if the plaintiffs are ever to realize payouts that even approach the magnitude of
the successful tobacco litigation.
Finally, the legislative process may end any discussion of the fast food
litigation before it ever really begins. Both the Commonsense Consumption Act
and the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act would effectively
preempt current and future lawsuits of this nature if and when they are signed
into law. While the Association of Trial Lawyers does have a stake in defeating
these bills, it is unlikely that they are willing to spend the political capital neces-
sary to do so. Indeed, an examination of that group's website does not reveal
any indication that lobbying efforts are currently being pursued to defeat either
of these bills.
154
On the other hand, however, the MEAL Act would represent a victory
for the consumer groups that are currently pushing for full disclosure of fast
food nutritional information. It remains to be seen if any of these bills will be-
come law.
While Professor Banzhaf' s theory has served to facilitate the market-
place of ideas with regards to the direction of the American legal system, that
appears to be all that it has done. The theory that the fast food industry should
be held responsible for the health condition of a frequent consumer is entirely
without merit. Barring a remarkable set of facts that is outside this author's
154 The website of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (http://www.atla.org) was
examined unsuccessfully on November 21, 2004 for any indication of efforts taken to defeat the
above cited pieces of legislation.
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imagination, the analysis herein indicates that this theory has no legal founda-
tion on which to build even the most attenuated of cases.
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